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Abstract
The relationship between multifunctionality and the roles of rural communities has not been discussed fully
although the connection between the two is an essential issue in the rural policy arena. Pursuing this issue, this
paper considers that multifunctional hamlet activities are generated as institutional joint products within the
hamlet. Also evaluated is the connection between multifunctional activities and institutional hamlet conditions
under the Japanese direct payment program for less favored areas.
Results of conceptual considerations and empirical evaluations reveal that specific multifunctional hamlet
activities depend on hamlet conditions; those on the least favorable level tend to perform land preservation
activities while those under the most favorable conditions tend to undertake recreational activity. Hamlets
participating in forming landscape fall in the middle. Thus, firstly, institutional jointness is not constant but
variable depending on hamlet conditions. Consequently, programs to enhance multifunctionality should respect
hamlet conditions that represent different levels of institutional jointness of multifunctional activity rather than
treat multifunctionality as a single concept. Secondly, for diversification, it would be effective to organize hamlet
activities based on an open and wider human network rather than the traditional closed one in rural
communities.
Keywords: multifunctionality, rural community, institution, jointness, diversification, human resources, direct
payment
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On the Relationship between Multifunctionality and Hamlet Activities as a Rural Institution
1. Introduction
Multifunctionality has tended to be discussed as a single concept although it actually includes multifunctional
activities, and the conditions under which each is promoted are considered to differ1). For instance, rural tourism
is an activity that internalizes the externality of multifunctionality while another activity may not2). Therefore, to
ensure the effectiveness of policy measures to promote multifunctionality, each feature of a multifunctional
activity should be evaluated.
Little attention has been given to the multifunctionality provided by collective action, such as hamlet activities.
Yet such multifunctional activities are crucial in promoting multifunctionality from the perspective of both
Japanese and East Asian rural policies3) that have been emphasizing community-based agricultural and rural
development. In studying this issue, an institutional approach is effective because hamlet activity has been
based on the institutional process and such an approach will help to clarify the institutional jointness of
multifunctionality4).
As such an example of this jointness, a direct payment program for less favored areas was started in 2000 in
Japan and has been used to promote multifunctionality in those areas5). This program mandates that the rural
community agree to maintain farmland and hamlet activities that promote multifunctionality in the rural
community. This is because for centuries the role of the rural community has been essential in farming and in
life as an institutional foundation in this country. We feel that this program is an example that implicitly assumes
institutional jointness wherein hamlet activity generates multifunctionality.
However, we do not have an effective institutional framework that can be applied to rural community issues
because the institutional approach has focused on farm organizations and policy aspects rather than on the
rural community6). We need an institutional framework applicable not only to hamlet activities based solely on
the traditional closed human network in the rural community but also to those based on an open human
intercommunity network. The latter perspective will become more important in the rural policy arena and for
identification of new roles for rural communities.
In consideration of this background, this paper focuses on multifunctional activities under the direct payment
program (hereafter, this program) and aims to clarify how each multifunctional activity is connected with levels of
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hamlet conditions from a conceptual and empirical point of view. In addressing these aims, firstly, we briefly
outline the program. Then we explore a conceptual model to deal with institutional aspects of hamlet activity
and, based on the conceptual model, we estimate empirical multifunctional activity determinant models to
clarify the features of multifunctional activities and factors that determine those features. Finally, we discuss
prospects for future policy direction in promoting multifunctionality.
2. Data
Data at the hamlet level are not disclosed on a nationwide basis. Therefore, this paper uses data disclosed by
the administrative body of this program, the Rural Development Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries of Japan (MAFFJ), which is “The Result of the Direct Payment Program in the Hilly and Mountainous
Areas 2001,” and which were aggregated at the prefectural level in the 2001 fiscal year. Data for the 2002
version are also available, but do not contain details of hamlet conditions necessary for empirical evaluation.
Therefore, we used the 2001 data that cover all 47 prefectures. Included from this source are data on
multifunctional hamlet activities.
3. Outline of direct payment program and multifunctionality
The program requires one of two kinds of agreements from participants. One is a hamlet agreement entered
into by hamlets and the other is an individual agreement signed by designated farmers. These farmers are
progressive model farmers designated by the prefectural government as policy targets. As of year 2001 hamlet
agreements comprised 98.1% (32,067) of all agreements and individual agreements accounted for only 1.9%
(605) of agreements. This is because the program places importance on hamlet functions. Therefore, this
paper also focuses on hamlet agreements.
This program has two aims: to preserve farmland and to promote multifunctionality in the hilly and
mountainous less competitive areas based on hamlet activities that have been the foundation of farming and
rural life for centuries. For this reason, hamlets that want to receive a direct payment are required to sign a
hamlet agreement defining what activities they will perform for preservation of farmland and enhancement of
multifunctionality as a unit of the local community.
As of 2001, this program was implemented in the 1,900 towns and cities that had hamlet agreements;
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613,304 farmers participated and there were 627,736 ha of beneficiary land. The total payment was 51 billion
132 million yen. On average, each hamlet agreement had 19.5 participants and 20 ha of designated farmland.
Payment received was 1,630,000 yen per hamlet and 83,000 yen per capita as shown in Table 1.
The acreage that agreements, including individual agreements, cover comprises 80.8% of the targeted
farmland. Covered are 77.0% of rice paddy, 59.4% of upland, 93.1% of cultivated grassland, and 75.6% of
meadow. One reason for the lower coverage in upland is that the program mainly aims at the paddy, rice being
the main crop in this country in terms of land use and production, and the grassland in hilly and mountainous
areas.
In examining the hamlet agreement in detail, it is evident that the first aim concerns minimum acreage for
farmland preservation. A hamlet agreement must satisfy one of two conditions: coverage of more than one
hectare of single or unit farmland or coverage of more than one hectare of total area of separated farmlands that
have been farmed consistently as one unit.
The latter condition for separated farmlands is related to how consistent farming is conducted as a single unit
and thus needs collective action for preserving these farmlands, that is, “the condition of farming consistency”.
This is “red-tape” terminology, so it needs a little explanation. Simply put, this condition indicates the degree of
farming cooperation7) in the hamlet. Farming cooperation has been traditionally practiced among hamlet
members to provide mutual help such as exchange of labor during busy seasons and, in more recent times,
contract-based cooperation in use of machinery. This program is based on these communal practices in this
country. Under these circumstances, consistent or cooperative farming operations are considered to be crucial
for preservation of farmland in the hamlet because they indicate how the level of hamlet conditions influences
signing of a hamlet agreement for multifunctional activity. Strictly speaking, the status of farming cooperation is
a result or outcome of hamlet conditions rather than a reflection of hamlet conditions. However, we consider
that the status of farming cooperation will affect multifunctional activity because multifunctionality is a joint
production of farming activity in the hamlet; thus, we should take into account the institutional connection
between farming and multifunctional activities in the hamlet.
Hamlet agreements that applied to consistent farming operations made up 60.3% of all agreements. The
following three types of hamlet behaviors are conducted in consistent farming operations in order of
prevalence: 1) maintenance of irrigation lines and farm roads by hamlet members accounts for 73.8% of the
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total, 2) exchange of farming operation services and joint farming operations are conducted in the hamlet,
mutually benefiting hamlet members and accounting for 23.7% of the total, and 3) performance of farming
activities by the same farming groups or farming corporate bodies (4%) (Table 1). The necessary cost level of
these activities rises with the decreased prevalence of the three activities, with the lowest level of cost required
for the maintenance of waterways and farm roads and the highest for group or corporate farming (Table 1).
Concerning the second aim, which is to promote multifunctional activities, in reality numerous activities are
widely interpreted as “multifunctional hamlet activities”, even though they do not always correspond directly to
the generally accepted concept of multifunctionality. Thus, we classified these activities into the following three
major multifunctional activities: preservation of land (land-preservation function), which includes clearing away
undergrowth of woods surrounding farmland; the formation of landscape (landscape-formation function), which
includes cultivating crops and plant materials that preserve the beauty of the countryside; and recreation
(recreational function), examples of which are leasing for one year a terrace paddy or renting farm plots for
those who seek an agricultural experience as recreation and also providing farmhouse accommodations for
tourists.
Among the hamlet agreements, preservation of land is the most common practice (58.6%), followed by
formation of landscape (38.3%). Recreation accounts for only 3.2% of activity (Table 1). These differences in
share suggest that there are different cost levels necessary for each multifunctional hamlet activity. The lowest
cost is related to preserving land and the highest cost is related to recreation, with forming landscape in the
middle. Therefore, it can be concluded that different multifunctional activities are undertaken depending on the
cost-bearing capability of the hamlets; the higher the cost for multifunctional activity, the fewer hamlets conduct
that activity.
We have characterized multifunctional hamlet activities into two types depending on the orientation of
internalization of externality: the non-internalizing type and the internalizing type.
The former, the non-internalizing type, is a hamlet activity that is based on traditional hamlet actions such as
maintenance of the farm road and irrigation system and preserving farmland. These activities are
conventionally institutionalized as collective work, called “village work” (Kawano [7]), to maintain the
community’s farm production base. These are considered as land preserving activity, which may not internalize
external effects.
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The latter, the internalizing type, is a hamlet activity that is undertaken as a new activity such as rural tourism
that has not been conventionally institutionalized although this activity could occur on the basis of conventional
hamlet activity. Especially, recreational activity such as rural tourism will be in this category. Rural tourism is an
activity that enables farmers to internalize the externality that has not been rewarded and then create a new
income source.
The landscape-forming function will be intermediate between the two types of activities, that is, involving
non-internalizing and internalizing activities because this function is considered to be comprised of two features.
4. Conceptual Model
We have endeavored to clarify what and how hamlet conditions influence institutional cost structure and
jointness. Figure 1 summarizes the view presented in this paper, wherein we assume that hamlet conditions
determine multifunctional activities through the institutional cost structure in the hamlet. This whole process
represents the institutional jointness that generates multifunctional hamlet activities. In this model, hamlet
conditions are comprised of two main factors, human resources and consensus-making, with other conditions
of agricultural production playing a role. These conditions determine institutional costs and the optimal
multifunctional activities undertaken as a hamlet function. Empirically we consider two models: model 1, which
estimates the institutional cost structure, and model 2, which estimates how hamlet conditions create actual
differences in the undertaken multifunctional activities.
We present a conceptual model that enables us to explore the institutional factors and relationships8)
between hamlet multifunctional activity and hamlet size for a hamlet agreement under this program. This model
of the institutional process will be applicable not only to hamlet agreements, but also to multifunctional activities
in hamlets in general.
First, we assume that farmers in the hamlet act on the principle of minimizing the average cost of the
multifunctional hamlet activity rather than on the principle of minimizing marginal cost. This is because hamlet
activities have been traditionally maintained by non-profit behavior as collective action for mutual help in the
local community. Second, we assume that decision making about hamlet activity is determined by a consensus
among hamlet members, which also has been the traditional decision-making method. This program allows
farmers to take cost minimizing behavior in the range of a municipality that generally consists of multiple
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hamlets. Therefore, multifunctional activity would be undertaken not only on a single-hamlet basis, but also on a
multiple-hamlet basis.
With the above two assumptions, suppose other conditions are considered as constant and based on the
reality of the hilly and mountainous areas, we assume two institutional factors that determine the cost of
multifunctional hamlet activities; human resources and consensus-making among hamlet members9). Thus, we
consider two cost factors: the cost of utilizing human resources and the cost of consensus-making. The vertical
sum of the two cost curves becomes the total average cost (AC). Therefore, equation (1) is assumed
concerning multifunctional hamlet activity i.
ACi(x) =HCi(x) +NCi(x) (1)
Where, ACi(x) =average cost curve of multifunctional hamlet activity i in the hamlet agreement
HC i (x) =average cost for utilizing human resources for multifunctional hamlet activity i
NC i (x) =average cost for consensus-making for multifunctional hamlet activity i
x= size of hamlet agreement
Farmers in the hamlet are supposed to minimize the average cost AC consisting of the two factors and then
the optimal size of the hamlet agreement is determined for each activity. This is depicted in Figure 2 showing
measurement of the cost level vertically and size of participants in the hamlet agreement horizontally. These
two factors have opposite relationships with the size of the hamlet agreement for reasons that we will explain
below.
First, the average cost of utilizing human resources has a negative relationship with the size of the hamlet
agreement, which is illustrated by the curve HC. Utilizing human resources is crucial to conducting hamlet
activity but is difficult, especially in hilly and mountainous areas10). In the case of little availability of human
resources, the cost of utilizing human resources is prohibitive. Therefore, the more you expand the size of the
hamlet agreement, the greater the possibility of finding appropriate human resources will be, and then these
participants can share the cost of the multifunctional activity. In other words, per capita average cost of utilizing
human resources is supposed to be non-positively correlated, that is, negative or no correlation, with the size of
participants, which means that we can expect a rightward-declining curve.
Second, the average consensus-making cost has a positive relationship with size, which is illustrated as
curve NC. The larger the number of participants, the greater is the increase in transaction cost for reaching
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consensus. This is because an increase in people involved shifts the pattern of consensus-making from that
among acquaintances to that among those not acquainted. Consequently, the average cost for making a
consensus is non-negatively correlated, that is, positive or no correlation, with the size of hamlet agreements,
which means that we can expect a rightward-increasing curve.
Third, the vertical sum of the two cost curves results in the total average cost curve (AC). Thus the total
average cost of multifunctional activity i for the optimal size hamlet agreement is determined and AC reaches
the minimum at point e in Figure 2. As already mentioned, the optimal size hamlet agreement would consist of a
single hamlet or multiple hamlets, depending on the institutional cost factors.
This is the basic conceptual framework of the relationship between multifunctionality and hamlet behaviour,
which shows how the total average cost is determined.
For simplification it is assumed that direct payment causes a downward shift of the AC curve in the long run.
This study is conducted for AC evaluation under the initial conditions. In other words, this study does not
evaluate the effects of the direct payment, but evaluates the initial hamlet conditions for multifunctional activities.
Thus the optimal size of each multifunctional activity is determined although the optimal point differs from
one area to another depending on the cost structure attributed to local conditions of the institutional factors.
Consequently, cost curves are obtained for each multifunctional activity. The above conceptual model is a
general framework; therefore, we need a more concrete model applicable for empirical study.
5. Analytical model
Here we explore how to apply the above conceptual model to an empirical study by considering the possible
institutional cost structure. In fact, we can not observe actual AC curves, but only aggregated envelop curves at
the national level. Thus, we focus on the VCi curve that envelops the ACicurves of each area at the national
level concerning multifunctional activity i. Naturally, VC curves have more flexibility regarding the size of
participants than AC curves. With these decision-making processes, hamlets determine optimal multifunctional
activity based on their cost-bearing capabilities. If the same characteristics as shown in Figure 2 are correctly
reflected in the VC curves, the information presented in Table 2 can show how the combination of shapes of the
VC envelop cost curves influences the two institutional factors. There are four different cases of cost structure to
be considered.
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The first case (Case 1) involves those hamlets that have a high level of hamlet function under favorable
conditions. Thus, in Case 1 as depicted in Figure 3, those hamlets can conduct multifunctional activity
sufficiently at a low institutional cost in terms of utilizing both human resources and consensus-making. In this
sense, those hamlets have higher cost-bearing capability for conducting multifunctional activity than ordinary
hamlets and therefore the institutional jointness is supposedly more stable than in the other cases. For instance,
in Figure 3 those hamlets that can conduct this multifunctional activity at the cost oa have cost-bearing capacity
ad if od is the maximum cost level for implementing multifunctional activity. Nevertheless, this case hardly
represents the majority of actual situations in hilly and mountainous areas because this case is too favorable for
ordinary hamlets in these areas.
On the opposite extreme of Case 1, those rural areas with hamlet conditions at a low level inevitably have
high costs both for consensus-making and utilizing human resources (Case 4). In this case, the level of hamlet
function is too low to start a hamlet agreement, meaning that the cost-bearing capability is too low. In other
words, institutional costs are still too high to bear for those hamlets. We do not expect institutional jointness in
this case. This case is not illustrated because this case falls above od in Figure 3.
There exist intermediate cases in which hamlet function can be maintained at a level between those extreme
cases described above. Those intermediate cases are not uncommon, and, in fact, in such hamlets one cost is
usually higher than the other. For example, in one case (Case 2) the cost of utilizing human resources is low
while consensus-making costs are high. In the other case (Case 3), there is a high cost for utilizing human
resources and a low consensus-making cost.
In Case 2, the shape of the VC curve indicates that the cost-increasing portion is greater than the
cost-decreasing portion, so the right upward portion becomes larger. Conversely, in Case 3, the
cost-decreasing portion is greater than the cost-increasing portion, so the right downward portion becomes
larger.
These different shapes provide not only information on institutional cost structure, but also on different
prospects for multifunctional hamlet activities. In Case 2, it could be more effective to undertake hamlet activities
within the traditional community range because it is rational for hamlets in Case 2 to save consensus-making
cost. Conversely, in Case 3, it could be more appropriate to undertake hamlet activities in the inter-community
range, which suggests that it will be rational to utilize the extended human network beyond a single hamlet
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boundary.
What we deal with here are Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3 as depicted in Figure 3, because Case 4 is not
considered to be feasible for a hamlet agreement due to the lowest hamlet conditions. How these three cases
are connected with multifunctional activities is the empirical question.
6. Structural and estimation models
We focus on the three multifunctional activities: land-preserving activity, landscape-forming activity, and
recreational activity. In fact, data for the cost function VC in the conceptual model above are not available, so
that it is not possible to estimate the cost function directly. What is observable is the portion of undertaken
multifunctional activity in the hamlet agreement at the prefectural level, called variable Y. Therefore, under the
conceptual framework of cost minimizing behavior we use variable NY (=1-variable Y) as a proxy variable for
the cost for each multifunctional activity11). We expect that the larger the variable NY is, the higher the cost for
this multifunctional activity is. Put differently, we can assume a proportional relationship between the cost level
of multifunctional activity and the variable NY. This is why we use the variable NY for the estimation. If the
parameter is negative, the variable works favorably for the multifunctional activity and if the parameter is positive,
the variable works unfavorably.
1) Model 1: Institutional cost structure
The next question is into which case each multifunctional activity actually falls. To clarify this point, we consider
a VC curve determinant model concerning multifunctional activity k as below.
VCk=f (xk) (2)
Where, VCk=envelop cost for multifunctional activity k
xk =size of participants for multifunctional activity k
Regarding explanatory variables, first we use participant size per hamlet agreement as the explanatory
variable of the size of the hamlet agreement. There are two reasons for this. 1) The participant size is not
available for a specific multifunctional activity per se, but for each hamlet agreement that contains
multifunctional activities. 2) We can assume that the participant size in a hamlet agreement roughly equals the
size of each multifunctional activity because hamlet behavior is originally a unit of activity in this program.
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Furthermore, to consider the difference in farm size in Hokkaido, a northern island, from other parts of Japan,
we use a regional dummy variable: Hokkaido=1, other prefectures=0. The estimation model is a quadratic
function. The estimation method is OLS. Strictly speaking, this estimated curve is different from the envelop cost
curve. This is because OLS estimated curves will be inward curves rather than actual envelop curves, which
means that the estimated cost level would be overestimated. However, the shape of the envelop curve will be
clarified by this estimation. Bearing this in mind, we should be careful in the interpretation of the parameters.
NYki=αk0+αk1(xki)2+αk2 xki +αk3HD ki +εki (3)
Where, NYki =1 -(portion of undertaken multifunctional activity k in prefecture i)
xki =participant size of multifunctional activity k in prefecture i
HD ki =regional dummy variable (Hokkaido=1, others=0)
ε
k
i=stochastic error
αj
k=parameter to be estimated, αok =constant
2) Model 2: factors determining multifunctional activities
Here, we evaluate what and how the factors of hamlet conditions listed in Figure 1 are connected with
multifunctional activities. First is how the difference in human resources works, second is how the degree of
consensus-making works, and third is how differences in agricultural production work.
VC =f (hc, nc, ag) (4)
Where, hc =vector of human resources factors
nc =vector of consensus-making factors
ag =vector of agricultural production factors
The dependent variable is the same as above. Because of limited availability of data, the explanatory
variables are as follows:
In the data for the first variable of human resources, we take the portion of the elderly because the problems
related to an aging population are much more serious in the mountainous and hilly areas. However, such data
are not available at every agreement level. As an alternative, in this direct payment program, the local
government is able to designate farmland with a ratio of elderly of 40% and a high land abandonment ratio at its
own discretion12). Thus, we used the above criteria as the proportion of elderly since the data are available on
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the prefectural level. Generally, progression of aging results in depopulation, making it more difficult to secure
human resources. This could be a major obstacle for starting a new multifunctional activity. Nevertheless, it
could be a factor in promoting non-internalizing hamlet activity. Therefore, we do not give any sign condition
beforehand.
For the second variable of consensus-making, we take “the condition of farming consistency”, or the
condition of farming cooperation, which is a necessary condition for a hamlet agreement as mentioned. We
consider two cases in accordance with the level of farming cooperation. We use a dummy variable either for the
ordinary level or the high level in estimation. The ordinary level of cooperation is the case whereby one of the
three farming consistency conditions mentioned above was met (yes=1, no=0). The highest level is the case
wherein group farming or corporate farming is practiced (yes=1, no=0). Generally speaking, the higher the level
of farming cooperation, the lesser could be the consensus-making cost for multifunctional activities. However,
whether this is correct for every multifunctional activity is not a predetermined fact, but an empirical question to
be examined. Therefore, we do not give a sign condition.
In the third vector of agricultural production, firstly we consider how the difference in farming productivity
among areas affects a diversified activity such as rural tourism. To deal with this point, we use two opposing
hypotheses. With the first hypothesis, it can be assumed that the larger the negative productivity gap, the
greater the eagerness to promote farm diversification, such as rural tourism or the internalizing type of
multifunctional activity, to gain additional income, i.e. the productivity gap hypothesis. Thus, this point aims at
evaluating the possibility of farm activities taking advantage of multifunctionality in farming in less competitive
areas. The second hypothesis, contrary to the first, assumes that areas with high productivity could be easily
converted to diversified activity by taking advantage of the favorable farming conditions, i.e. the reverse
productivity gap hypothesis. In short, if the first productivity gap hypothesis is true, the less competitive the area
is, the greater the eagerness to undertake multifunctional activity of the internalizing type. On the other hand,
the more competitive the area, the more diversified will be the activity to support the reverse productivity gap
hypothesis.
Thus, if the productivity gap hypothesis is accepted, diversified activity will contribute to reducing the
geographical productivity gap. Otherwise, if the reverse productivity gap will be adopted, the gap will widen.
Therefore, findings on the issue of a productivity gap can disclose how productivity is connected with
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diversification behavior. Results of the estimation below will reveal which hypothesis can be accepted.
The productivity gap variable was obtained from the gross agricultural product per hectare as surveyed by
MAFFJ. The data are calculated in the formula: the national average minus the prefectural data in 200013). If the
parameter is negative, the productivity gap hypothesis is accepted. This is because the lower the productivity,
the more seriously needed are other income sources, which reduces the cost for this type of hamlet activity. In
contrast, if the parameter is positive, the higher the productivity, the more activity is undertaken, which is the
case of the reverse productivity gap hypothesis.
Secondly, as another variable of agricultural production, we consider the difference in land use reflecting
essential factors of farming. We consider variables of land use focusing on rice paddy and livestock farming,
which are major land uses in the program. For paddy we classify paddy as less steep (yes=1, no=0) and steep
(yes=1, no=0) because all areas concerned are disadvantaged areas in terms of geographical and farming
conditions. For livestock farming, we take steep grassland (yes=1, no=0). One of these dummy variables is
used for estimation. Here again none of the sign conditions are predetermined.
The estimation model is below.
NYki=β0k+β1khcki+β2kncki+β3kag1ki+β4k ag2ki+φki (5)
Where, hc ki =elderly ratio of multifunctional activity k in prefecture i
nc ki =farming constituency dummy variable (either farming consistency in general or group farming)
ag1
k
i =productivity gap variable
ag2
k
i =land use dummy variable (either less steep paddy or steep paddy or steep grass land)
φ
k
i=stochastic error
βj
k=parameter to be estimated, βok =constant
We do not use the regional dummy used in model 1 because it correlates with other explanatory variables.
Estimation was conducted by OLS to compare the three multifunctional activities and to obtain indicators of
multicollinearity.
7. Estimation results
1) Model 1
The estimation result is shown in Table 3. Heteroscedasticity was not found by the White test. However, we
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cannot say that we had satisfactory results. The VIF and CN indicators were so high that multicollinearity was
serious14). This is because of a strong correlation between the quadratic and linear terms of size variables.
Therefore the parameters are not stable and are hard to interpret in detail. Still, we can obtain information for
shapes of the cost curves.
This strong correlation between quadratic and linear terms means that the cost curve is a monotonously
increasing or decreasing function for size. In other words, either the right downward portion or the right upward
portion of the curve is quite large. This suggests that one of the two institutional factors works much more
strongly than the other, which does not occur in Case 1 whereby the two factors work evenly. This is one of the
main reasons for the serious multicollinearity. Thus we estimated models using only one size variable in
quadratic or linear terms. For this reason, we only interpret the signs of the parameters.
The results of these cases of single-size variables are also shown in Table 3. Adjusted R2 is the highest for
recreational activity, followed by land-preserving activity and is lowest for landscape-forming activity. This is
because land-preserving activity and landscape-forming activity are activities commonly undertaken across the
nation, which makes the characteristic less apparent. The regional dummy is positive in the land-preserving
function (5%).
Next, let us look into size parameters. What is obvious is that linear and quadratic terms have the same sign
and the sign is different from one multifunctional activity to another. The sign of land-preserving activity is
positive, while the signs of landscape-forming and recreational activity are negative15). The interesting point
here is that the sign reverses between the former and the latter two. What makes sense here is that in the first
quadrant both variables have positive values. In that quadrant the land-preserving activity is monotonously
increasing, which means that the right upward portion of the cost curve is large, while the landscape-forming
activity and the recreational activity are monotonously decreasing, which means that the right downward portion
is large.
In summary, we can characterize the relation between the VC cost curve and multifunctional activities in
Table 4. First, land-preserving multifunctional activity, as a non-internalizing activity, has the positive parameter
of size. This result suggests that the right upward portion of the VC curve is large, corresponding to Case 2.
Concerning cost factors, we can surmise that the decreasing effect of costs of utilizing human resources is
smaller than the increasing effect of consensus-making cost. This is because this type of hamlet activity is not a
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new activity, so that the cost of utilizing human resources would be low. However, on the other hand, the cost of
consensus-making would increase as size grows. In this case it is rational to take the behavior of saving the
consensus-making cost. Thus, it is safe to say that this characterizes non-internalizing hamlet behavior well.
Put differently, a relatively small size based on the conventional hamlet would be rational. In short, this is a result
of rational hamlet behavior and this multifunctional activity is undertaken in accordance with such a behavioral
principle.
On the contrary, landscape-forming activity and recreational activity, classified as internalizing or
internalizing-related hamlet activities, have negative parameters of size. This case is considered to be that in
which the right downward portion of the VC curve is large, corresponding to Case 3. This indicates that the
decreasing effect of utilizing human resources is greater than the increasing effect of consensus-making cost.
Therefore, it is rational to consider cost-saving behavior in utilizing human resources. This means that a group
of several hamlets or a wider hamlet network will be effective for these types of activity.
To summarize, the results of model 1 estimation suggest that there is an apparent difference derived from
the cost structure between internalizing hamlet activity and non-internalizing activity. For non-internalizing
hamlet activity, factors of consensus-making exert influence on the cost structure, so behavior in saving this
cost is taken. Conversely, for the internalizing-related hamlet activity the cost of utilizing human resources is
influential and this cost-saving behavior is performed. The implication of these results is that we should take into
account the different characteristics of institutional cost structure and therefore different jointness of
multifunctional activity. We explore factors related to these differences below.
2) Model 2
Results of estimation are shown in Tables 5-1, -2, -3. The F test for goodness of fit was significant in all
estimations in Tables 5-1 and -2 but not in some of Table 5-3 because there were differences of adjusted R2 just
like those in model 1. Multicollinearity was not a serious problem in any estimation due to VIF <10 and
heteroscedasticity was not observed. Let us examine estimation results.
First, land-preserving activity has the lowest adjusted R2 among the three activities (Table 5-1). This is
because this activity is too common to be distinguished from one region to another as mentioned earlier. The
parameters affirm this fact. Regarding the parameters, neither the elderly portion nor the productivity gap was
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significant. The opposite is farming consistency; farming consistency in general is a negative parameter while
group farming has a positive value with significance (1% level of significance for each).
These results mean that the level of farming cooperation up to a certain point works positively for
land-preserving activity but works negatively for land-preserving activity above such a point. Therefore,
land-preserving activity does not need a high level of farming cooperation, although this cooperation must reach
a certain level.
The parameters of land use condition reaffirm that this hamlet behavior is commonly practiced because they
were negative in paddy: less steep and steep paddy (5%). The parameter of steep grassland is slightly negative,
but not so apparent. To summarize, it is safe to say that this activity is undertaken in hamlets where paddy is
common, which is a typical rural land use in this country.
Second, the results of landscape-forming activity demonstrate a unique feature in the portion of elderly with
minus values (Table 5-2). The reason is that the activity of taking care of landscape plants, such as planting
flowers, requires relatively lighter labor for participation of the elderly than an ordinary farming operation. This
type of activity requires a relatively high level of farming cooperation unlike land-preserving activity. Farming
consistency was a positive parameter (1%) whereas group farming was negative (1%). This is probably
because this activity needs coherent collective action, especially for the elderly. The productivity gap is not
significant, meaning no connection with this type of activity. Regarding land use, livestock farming and
landscape-forming activity are not friendly; for example, steep grassland was positive. This is probably due to
natural constraints on diversified land use. In short, the areas that have a relatively high level of farming
cooperation and high portion of elderly prefer landscape-forming activity.
Finally, recreational activity has no connection with the portion of the elderly since its parameter has no
statistical difference at zero (Table 5-3). However, this type of activity needs a high level of hamlet function, as
does landscape-forming activity, since farming consistency is positive (1%) while group farming is negative. An
interesting point here is that the productivity gap hypothesis is barely accepted due its negative parameter, with
10% significance. This means that the productivity gap is accepted somewhat, so that low productivity areas
will be eager to diversify their activity through rural tourism. However, it should be noted that the degree of
farming cooperation exerts a stronger influence than the productivity gap.
Thus the results of the model 2 estimation revealed that choices of multifunctional activity would differ from
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one level of hamlet conditions to another. This also means that institutional jointness varies with hamlet
conditions. We give further consideration to the implication of these results.
8. Discussion
Table 6 summarizes the characteristics of the three multifunctional activities based on the estimation results.
Land-preserving activity is a commonly undertaken hamlet activity because the cost-bearing capability of
performing this hamlet activity is rather low, which means that extra cost reduction efforts are not required for
these hamlets. Thus, this is an example of widely applied institutional jointness. From the perspective of cost
structure, because of familiarity with this activity, the consensus-making cost is low and will mildly increase
when the size of participants grows. Cost of utilizing human resources will not decrease with size since there is
neither the possibility nor the necessity for new human resources in starting this activity. For this reason there is
neither orientation for internalizing the external effect into farm activity nor an increase in the size of the hamlet
agreement.
Landscape-forming activity tends to be undertaken by hamlets in accordance with an aging population and
with a relatively high level of hamlet function, characteristics that are not similar to land-preserving activity in this
aspect. Because of the use of elderly human resources, consensus-making cost is low and will not rise with
size while the cost of utilizing human resources is not too high and will decrease with size because of the
advantage taken of the human network among the elderly. In this sense, it is empirically confirmed that this
activity has intermediate features between land-preserving and recreational activities. So does the jointness.
Recreational activity needs the same high level of hamlet function as needed for group farming. This means
that there is potential to tackle a new activity based on this high level of hamlet function. In other words, the
cost-bearing capability for this activity is so high that only those hamlets that can perform at such low cost can
conduct this activity. Thus this type of institutional jointness is the most stable although it is not widely observed.
From the cost perspective, this means that consensus-making cost is sufficiently low because of highly
motivated participants and no prospect for increasing this cost with size, suggesting a nearly constant size. On
the other hand, there is some prospect of utilizing human resources, which means that a decreasing effect of
the cost of utilizing human resources would be expected with size16）. This is because often the main participants
in this activity are middle-aged farming women who are proactive in extending the human network among
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themselves.
Thus, the differences in these activities are derived from the conditions of the hamlet and explain rural reality
with no inconsistency.
9. Conclusions
Multifunctional activities differ from one rural area to another and these are often generated as a part of hamlet
activities in Japan. Therefore, this paper evaluated multifunctional activities as rural hamlet activities by
incorporating an institutional conceptual model under the direct payment program in Japan and conceptually
and empirically explored institutional factors working for these activities. The following are the main conclusions,
although we should be careful in generalizing the results to a great extent due to constraints on data and
estimation results.
First, it was revealed that multifunctional activities differ in cost structure and subsequently institutional
jointness varies. Thus, multifunctionality should be promoted taking into account these differences of
institutional jointness derived from local conditions.
Second, a community-based approach especially based on an open and extended human network rather
than on the traditional closed one in rural communities will be effective for developing rural and farm
diversification such as rural tourism.
Further, we observed a tendency that rural tourism activity was undertaken in areas with lower productivity.
This means that diversification will reduce the productivity gap between areas. Therefore, we should
emphasize diversification, taking advantage of multifunctionality, especially in the less competitive areas. In this
sense, farm policy should be implemented complementarily together with rural policy.
1) For relation between multifunctionality and agriculture, see OECD [12] from the policy perspective, Van
Huylenbroeck and Durand [18] from the European perspective and Ohe [13] from the Japanese perspective.
2) As an example of internalization of externality caused by multifunctionality, see Ohe [14], which explored
conceptual and empirical evaluation of rural tourism. Land-preserving activity, or countryside stewardship, see
Van Huylenbroeck and Whitby [17], OECD [11].
3) According to Platteau and Hayami [16], there are two types of rural communities: the village community
where inhabitants live in the same place and the tribal community where inhabitants have a nomadic way of life.
Japanese Journal of Rural Economics, Vol.8, pp. 41-57, 2006.
18
The rural community referred to here is the village community typically observed in East Asia.
4) For institutional jointness, see Hagedorn [5]. Little has been studied on institutional jointness conceptually
and empirically. We understand that institutional jointness represents a relationship that institutional factors are
involved in generating multifunctionality in the process of farming unlike technical jointness, which is determined
by technical aspects of farming. Institutional factors are those such as policy institutions, management
institutions and community institutions. We focus on rural community institutions here.
5) Yamashita [21], as a designer of this direct payment program, and National Chamber of Agriculture [10]
explained the purpose and details, while Hayami and Godo [4] is critical of this program. The five-year first stage
of this program ended in 2004 and the revised five-year second stage started in 2005.
6) For a neo-institutional economics approach to agricultural institutions, see Van Huylenbroeck et al. [19]. For a
more theoretical excursion of transaction cost economics, see Williamson [20]. However, the rural community
has not been studied in this literature. We also take a neo-institutional approach here.
7) For an overview of group faming in Japan see Ito [6]. Ohe [13] clarified the role- sharing relationship between
group faming in the hamlet and individual farm diversification activity.
8) We incorporate the idea of the public choice theory, one of the fields of neo-institutional economics, into the
conceptual framework. See Buchanan and Tullock [1], Muller [9], and Olson [15] for the public choice theory.
9) If the first derivative of the consensus-making cost or cost of utilizing human resource is zero, then
shape-wise the average cost curve would be linearly right upward or right downward. In this case marginal and
average costs become identical.
10) To utilize the appropriate human resources, there will be search cost for appropriate human resources.
However, this cost will be negligible because the search action will be undertaken within the range of the hamlet
or in the neighboring inter-hamlet areas.
11) Even if we use the variable Y instead of NY, the statistical results do not change except for the constant and
reversed signs of the parameters.
12) The portion of acreage covered by this criterion is 19.1% of all the designated areas on average.
13) We used a variable of income per hectare instead of the variable of land productivity for the estimation. The
goodness of fit was worse than in the latter case although we obtained similar parameters with the latter case.
14) Multicollinearity is serious when VIF is over ten or CN is over 15 by Chaterjee and Price [2], while Greene [3]
says over 20 of CN is the case. Kmenta [8] says that when CN is over 30 multicollinearity is harmful.
15) The negative parameter of the quadratic size variable means that the implicit assumption of the second
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order condition for cost minimization is not satisfied. Strictly speaking, in this case we should only examine the
result of the linear size variable case, where marginal and average costs are identical. This is a constraint of this
analysis that should be taken into consideration when we interpret the estimation results although in both cases
results were similar, showing negative sign for the size parameters.
16) We calculated the average size of participants in the hamlet agreement for the three multifunctional
activities: land preserving was 19.5 persons, landscape forming was 20.6, and recreational was 21.0. There
were no statistically significant differences among the three; hence, we could not confirm the economy of scale
in terms of the size of each cost factor. This is probably because we had to use not the size of each
multifunctional activity, but the average sizes of the hamlet agreement at the prefectural level due to data
constraints, which would make the variance of the data smaller.
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